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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pui suant to
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1.
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which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury), which
requires that the Court review the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in
a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Authorities for Standard of Review: Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt
Lake City, 156 P.3d 806, 2007 UT 25 (Utah 2007); Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 2001 UT
16 (Utah 2001); Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 108 P.3d 741, 2005 UT 14
(Utah 2005); Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 287 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1996);
Walker Drug Company, Inc. v. La Sal Oil Company, 902 P.2d 1229, 272 Utah Adv. Rep.
26 (Utah 1995).
2.

If the trial court did err in finding that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie

showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Mr. Veibell, whether Appellant
demonstrated (1) that Appellant neither knew, nor reasonably should have known, of the
facts underlying its First, Second, and Third Causes of Action before the applicable
statutes of limitation expired; or (2) that notwithstanding Appellant's actual or
constructive knowledge of the facts underlying its First, Second, and Third Causes of
Action within the applicable limitations periods, a reasonably diligent plaintiff in
Appellant's position would have delayed in filing its complaint until after the applicable
statutes of limitation had expired.
Standard of Review: The applicability of a statute of limitations and the discovery
rule are questions of law, which are reviewed for "correctness." However, the application
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of the discovery rule also involves a subsidiary factual determination (i.e., the point at
which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury), which
requires that the Court review the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in
a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Authorities for Standard of Review: Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt
Lake City, 156 P.3d 806, 2007 UT 25 (Utah 2007); Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 2001 UT
16 (Utah 2001); Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 108 P.3d 741, 2005 UT 14
(Utah 2005); Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 287 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1996);
Walker Drug Company, Inc., 902 P.2d 1229, 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1995).
At first glance, the Statement of Issues contained in Appellant's Brief suggests that
this appeal concerns only the issue set forth in Paragraph 1 above; however, the actual
Argument set forth in Appellant *s Brief also addresses the issue set forth in Paragraph 2
above. As such, Appellee has addressed both issues in this Brief
Additionally, for reasons set forth below, it is appropriate to limit the issues of this
appeal to Plaintiffs First, Second, and Third Causes of Action, respectively, as Appellant
has failed to set forth any grounds on which to appeal the trial court's dismissal of
Appellant's Fourth Cause of Action for "fraud. " To the extent that it is determined that
Appellant properly raised issues relevant to its Fourth Cause of Action for "fraud, "
Appellee reserves the right to supplement this Brief in order to more adequately address
that issue.
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25 (2006).
An action may be brought within four years:
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26 (2006).
An action may be brought within three years:
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for
specific recovery thereof...
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
All facts contained in this Statement of Facts are referenced to the proceedings
below. The cited record of proceedings below shall be referred to in the following
manner:
1.

References to the Record Pleadings and Entries at Numbered Pages of the
Record Index: (R. at

2.

).

References to the Official Transcript: (T. at
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).

A.

Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from a Memorandum Decision dated April 16, 2008, and an

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 9, 2008, both of
which were entered by the First District Court, Cache County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Thomas L. Willmore presiding (collectively the "Order"). Generally speaking,
the trial court found that Plaintiff had failed to bring its First, Second, Third, and Fourth
Causes of Action against Defendant within the time allowed by law, and that each of
those Causes of Action were, as a result, forever barred.
B.

Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff originally filed its Complaint against Defendant, Floyd Veibell, on or

about November 20, 2006. (R. at 4). Plaintiffs Complaint alleged, among other things,
four separate Causes of Action against Mr. Veibell. (R. at 4-11). Plaintiffs First Cause
of Action alleged "breach of fiduciary duty;" Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action alleged
"money by false pretenses;" Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action alleged "conversion;" and
Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action alleged "fraud." (R. at 11-13).
In response to Plaintiffs Complaint, Mr. Veibell promptly filed a Motion to
Dismiss generally alleging that Plaintiffs First and Second Causes of Action were barred
by the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25(3), that
Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Utah
Code Annotated § 78-12-26(2), and that Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action was barred by
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the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3). (R. at 129130). Plaintiff opposed Mr. VeibelFs Motion to Dismiss and filed, among other things, a
Rule 56(f) Motion requesting that the trial court continue the matter until the parties had
conducted discovery relative to the issues raised in Mr. Veibell's Motion to Dismiss. (R.
at 148). Pursuant to a Memorandum Decision dated February 21, 2007, the trial court
found that Mr. Veibell's Motion to Dismiss contained facts which were outside the
pleadings, converted said motion to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and allowed the parties to conduct discovery pertaining to
the applicable statutes of limitation. (R. at 167).
Upon completion of discovery, the parties' filed their respective supplemental
briefing as allowed by the trial court, and submitted the matter to the trial court for
decision. (R. at 301-441). On November 29, 2007, the trial court entered its
Memorandum Decision which provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

In the instant matter, the Court notes that conspicuously
absent from [Plaintiffs] pleadings is any assertation by
[Plaintiff] that it discovered the alleged wrongdoing, or
discovered enough facts to cause [Plaintiff] to make further
inquiry, on a specific date. While [Plaintiff] claims, as noted
above, that they discovered or became aware of the facts
forming the basis of the four causes of action during the
preparation of the Complaint, it is the Court's belief that
[Plaintiff] would have known or discovered at least some
evidence of alleged wrongdoing, sufficient to bring the four
causes of action, prior to the preparation of the Complaint in
order to even begin the process of filing this suit. (R. at 447).
-9-

Despite this finding, the trial court granted Plaintiff an additional fourteen days
within which to provide evidence to the trial court of the specific date on which Plaintiff
became aware of the facts forming the basis for the lawsuit. (R. at 447).
C.

Disposition in the Court Below
On February 195 2008, after receiving Plaintiffs supplemental evidence, the trial

court held a hearing on Mr. Veibell's pending motion to dismiss (which had appropriately
been converted into a motion for summary judgment the previous year). (R. at 551). At
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement (Id.), and
thereafter issued another Memorandum Decision on April 16, 2008. (R. at 632). Based
on the undisputed facts, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to make a prima
facie showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Mr. Veibell, thereby precluding
Plaintiffs invocation of the "equitable discovery rule" and the tolling of the applicable
statutes of limitation governing Plaintiffs First, Second, and Third Causes of Action,
respectively. (R. at 637). With regard to Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action, the trial
court concluded based on the undisputed facts that Plaintiff knew enough, or reasonably
should have known enough relevant facts during the years 1993 through 1997 to
investigate a potential lawsuit against Mr. Veibell and pursue its Fourth Cause of Action
for fraud. (R. at 638). As such, the trial court concluded that, even in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiffs four causes of action against Mr. Veibell were barred by
the applicable statutes of limitation. (R. at 639). The trial court thereafter entered its
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Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 9, 2008, and
dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint against Mr. Veibell with prejudice and on the merits. (R.
at 643).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

During the years 1990 through 1998, Defendant, Floyd Veibell, served as

the Mayor of the Town of Cornish. (R. at 121).
2.

In or about May of 1993, the Cornish Town Council approved Resolution

93-2, the purpose of which was to "(1) provide constant supervision and administration of
the Cornish culinary water system project through completion, (2) provide the necessary
manpower to set up monitoring and recording procedures for new water quality
requirements mandated by congress and administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency, and (3) develop a Drinking Water Source Protection Plan as required by new
State of Utah regulations" (the "Water Project"). (R. at 5, 121-122; 440).
3.

In or about May of 1993, Mr. Veibell was appointed by the Cornish Town

Council as the head of the Water Project. (R. at 5; 122). This job required that Mr.
Veibell engage in a variety of administrative activities. (R. at 331). As compensation for
this additional responsibility, Mr. Veibell5 s annual salary was increased by $10,000 for
the year 1993. (R. at 5; 122; 440).
4.

In or about 1993, at the approximate time Resolution 93-2 was passed, Mr.
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Veibell was also being paid by the Town for other work he was performing for the Town
as an independent subcontractor. (R. at 350; 420-421).
5.

Shortly after Resolution 93-2 was passed, while attending a meeting which

took place during approximately August or September of 1993, Mr. Veibell was asked by
a representative of Farmers Home Administration (who was involved in the Water
Project) to serve as the project inspector on the Water Project for $15.00 per hour, in
addition to his other administrative duties as the head of the Water Project for which he
received a $10,000 increase in his annual salary. (R. at 418). Representatives from the
Drinking Water Board were present at this meeting, as were representatives from Hansen,
Allen & Luce (the Water Project engineer). (Id). In response to this request, Mr. Veibell
agreed to serve as the project inspector on an independent contactor basis. (R. at 419).
6.

On October 14, 1993, during a regular meeting of the Cornish Town

Council, Dale Buxton (who was then serving as the Town Treasurer) reported that Mr.
Veibell had been hired as the project inspector on the Water Project, and that he was
going to be paid by the Town as an independent contractor with respect to those duties.
(R. at 419; 360-361). At this point in time, the Town had already appointed Mr. Veibell
as head of the Water Project, and authorized the $10,000 increase in his annual salary.
(R. at 5; 122; 440).
7.

During the years 1993 through 1997, Mr. Veibell submitted expense

vouchers in various amounts for services he had performed in connection with his
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inspection duties on the Water Project, and Mr. Veibell was compensated for the services
he had provided. (R. at 122). The Town agreed that Mr. Veibell was to submit vouchers
directly to the Water Project engineer (Hansen, Allen & Luce) who would then submit the
vouchers to Farmers Home Administration and the Drinking Water Board for approval.
(R. at 422-423). Mr. Veibell was under no obligation to submit any vouchers directly to
the Town, and the town never requested that he do so. {Id).
8.

As was the customary practice, all records for the Town of Cornish,

including records and vouchers pertaining to the Water Project, were kept at the home of
Mr. Veibell. (R. at 179). Certain records may also have been stored at the homes of other
members of the Town Council. {Id.).
9.

On or about February 9, 1995, the Cornish Town Council held another of its

regular meetings, during which the Town Council discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell had
been hired by the Town to inspect the water system for $15.00 per hour from the
beginning of the Water Project to its end. (R. at 363).
10.

Sometime during the year 1995, Dyer Pitcher, who was serving as a

councilman for the town of Cornish at the time, called an informal meeting of Town
Council members at his home. (R. at 299-300; 374). The purpose of the meeting was to
discuss Mr. Veibell's involvement in the Water Project, particularly the $15.00 per hour
payments that were being made to Mr. Veibell in connection with the same. (R. at 374;
300). Because this was an informal meeting, no minutes were taken (R. at 300; 374);
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however, those council members who were present specifically discussed the fact that Mr.
Veibell was being paid $15.00 per hour in addition to the $10,000 increase in his annual
salary for the year 1993. (R. at 300).
11.

At some point during the informal Town Council meeting at Dyer Pitcher's

home, Mr. Veibell was invited to the meeting, and was questioned by the Town Council
members regarding the Council's various concerns, including his involvement in the
Water Project, his role as mayor, and the $15.00 per hour payments that he was receiving
in addition to his $10,000 salary increase. (R. at 300; 374).
12.

During the year 1997, certain Town Council members began to, once again,

question the appropriateness of the payments that were being made to Mr. Veibell in
connection with the Water Project. (R. at 568; 10).
13.

In pursuit of these concerns, the Town Council contacted the Cache County

Attorney, Scott Wyatt, complained about the payments being made to Mr. Veibell, and
accused Mr. Veibell of criminal conduct. (R. at 568; 426). During Scott Wyatt's
involvement, Mr. Wyatt was informed by Mr. Veibell (or possibly others) that Mr.
Veibell had been paid $15.00 per hour by the Town as an independent contractor in
addition to the compensation he received in connection with his other duties and work on
the Water Project. (R. at 574-575).
14.

As was the customary practice, the matter was referred by Scott Wyatt to

the Cache County Sheriffs Office, who was asked to conduct an investigation to
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determine whether Mr. Veibell had, in fact, engaged in any type of unlawful or criminal
conduct. (R. at 10; 569). The Cache County Sheriffs Office; however, transferred the
matter to the Utah Attorney General's Office who ultimately conducted the investigation
of Mr. Veibell. (R. at 569; 393).
15.

As part of the investigation, Brad Blair, who had been asked to investigate

the matter on behalf of the Attorney General's Office, visited Mr. Veibell at his home,
and questioned him regarding his involvement in the Water Project. (R. at 427). During
this meeting, Mr. Veibell answered Mr. Blair's questions, and provided Mr. Blair with the
identities of other persons who had additional information concerning the subject matter
of the investigation. (R. at 427). Mr. Blair also informed Mr. Veibell during this meeting
that he had previously spoken with several other individuals and entities as part of the
investigation. (R. at 427). Mr. Blair may also have met with other members of the Town
Council itself. (R. at 427).
16.

The Appellant incorrectly avers, under the Statement of Facts section of its

appellate brief, that Mr. Veibell withheld material information from the Cache County
Attorney that could have been used as part of the investigation, including the fact that he
was being paid $15.00 per hour for inspection work in addition to the $10,000 salary
increase. (See Brief of Appellant at Pages 6 and 9). This allegation of fact is asserted for
the first time only after the Notice of Appeal was filed. However, there is no evidence in
the Record to support any such assertion. In fact, the portions of the Record to which the
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Town refers in support of this allegation show only that Mr. Veibell does not specifically
recall much of what was disclosed or discussed with Brad Blair, Scott Wyatt, or any other
person involved in the 1997 investigation. (R. at 316; 340-342; 427-428).
17.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Utah Attorney General's Office

contacted Scott Wyatt and informed him that there was no evidence that Mr. Veibell had
committed any wrongdoing, and that Mr. Veibell's conduct appeared to be appropriate.
(R. at 570).
18.

After being informed of the results of the investigation by the Attorney

General's Office, Scott Wyatt had a conversation with Mr. Veibell wherein he explained
to Mr. Veibell that there was no evidence of wrongdoing or criminal intent, and that the
matter would be dismissed without further action. (R. at 564; 570).
19.

After discussing the matter with Scott Wyatt, Mr. Veibell requested that

Scott Wyatt memorialize the results of the investigation in writing so that Mr. Veibell
would have a personal record of the same. (R. at 427; 570).
20.

Scott Wyatt agreed with Mr. VeibelPs request, and mailed Mr. Veibell a

letter dated May 5, 1997 which stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
As you know a town council member, apparently in good
faith, complained to me that you were inappropriately
converting municipal funds to your use. I asked that the
matter be investigated by the Sheriffs office who apparently
transferred the case to the Attorney General's office. The
A.G. investigator reported back to me that, at the conclusion
of his investigation, he could find no evidence of any wrong
doing on your part - that in fact everything appeared
-16-

appropriate to him. (R. at 393).
21.

On or about May 8, 1997, the Cornish Town Council held another of its

regular meetings. (R. at 369-372). At this meeting, the Town Council, once again,
discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell had been hired by the Town to inspect the water
system for $15.00 per hour during the ongoing construction. (R. at 370). The Council
also discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell's salary had been increased by an additional
$10,000 as compensation for the work that he had provided in connection with the Water
Project. (R. at 371). The Council also discussed the investigation that had been
completed by the Attorney General's Office, and the letter written by Scott Wyatt
concerning the results of that investigation was read aloud to all who were present. (R. at
371).
22.

On or about November 20, 2006, approximately nine years after the

Attorney General's investigation of Mr. Veibell had been completed, the Town filed its
Complaint against Mr. Veibell with the First District Court in Cache County, Utah. (R. at
4).
23.

The Town's Complaint alleged four separate causes of action against Mr.

Veibell, all of which were based on Mr. Veibell being paid $15.00 per hour as an
independent contractor on the Water Project in addition to the $10,000 increase in his
salary. (R. at 12-14).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Town has failed to make a prima facie showing of affirmative

fraudulent concealment on the part of Mr. Veibell. During all relevant time periods, the
Town had full knowledge that Mr. Veibell submitted his $15.00 per hour payment
vouchers directly to the Water Project engineer (Hansen, Allen & Luce) rather than to the
Town Council itself. The Town was also aware that Mr. Veibell maintained various
records (including records pertaining to the Water Project) at his home, as was the
customary practice at the time. The Town has always had the right to review those
records, and Mr. Veibell took no action to prevent any such review from taking place.
Finally, the Town has failed to prove that Mr. Veibell engaged in any type of concealment
during the course of his criminal investigation by the Utah Attorney General's Office or
otherwise. For these reasons, the trial court did not err by finding that the Town failed to
make a prima facie showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment necessary to toll the
applicable statutes of limitations.
2.

Even if the Town were to have made a prima facie showing of affirmative

fraudulent concealment, the Town knew, or reasonably should have known, of the facts
underlying its First, Second, and Third Causes of Action before the fixed limitations
periods expired; and, a reasonably diligent plaintiff in the Town's position would not
have delayed the filing of its complaint until November 20, 2006. Under the facts of this
case, the Town Council knew, as early as October of 1993, that Mr. Veibell was being
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paid $15.00 per hour in addition to receiving a $10,000 increase in his annual salary for
his duties related to the Water Project. During 1995 and 1997, the Town Council held
several meetings where these issues were discussed at length, and a criminal investigation
of Mr. Veibell was conducted by the Attorney General's Office during 1997. Based on
the information that was available to the Town, the Town knew (or reasonably should
have known) of the facts underlying its claims prior to November 20, 2006, and any
reasonably diligent plaintiff in the Town's position would have pursued its claims prior to
that point in time. As such, each of the Town's Causes of Action against Mr. Veibell
were properly dismissed.
3.

Because the statute of limitations that is applicable to the Town's Fourth

Cause of Action against Mr. Veibell contains a "statutory discovery rule," the "equitable
discovery rule" argued by the Town in support of its Fourth Cause of Action does not
apply. Therefore, the Town's failure to assert any alternative issue with regard to the
dismissal of its Fourth Cause of Action precludes this Court from overturning the trial
court's ruling on that issue.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE TOWN
FAILED TO SATISFY THE "FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
DOCTRINE" WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST, SECOND, AND
THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION.
In this case, the Town's First, Second, and Third Causes of Action were each
-19-

dismissed for not being filed within the time allowed by law. Generally speaking, a
statute of limitations begins to run "upon the happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action. Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 108 P.3d
741 (Utah 2005). Charlesworth v. Reyns, 113 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2005); Berenda v.
Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996); Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake
City, 156 P.3d 806 (Utah 2007). Once a statute of limitations has begun to run, a plaintiff
must file his or her claims before the limitations period expires; otherwise, the claim will
be forever barred. Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 746. "Mere ignorance of the existence of
a cause of action will neither prevent the running of the statute of limitations nor excuse a
plaintiffs failure to file a claim within the relevant statutory period." Id.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged the
existence of the so-called "discovery rule," which contains two "narrow" settings where a
statute of limitations may be tolled until the discovery of facts forming the basis for a
particular cause of action. Id. The first setting in which the "discovery rule" applies
involves situations where a relevant statute of limitations, by its own terms, mandates
application of the discovery rule (i.e., the "statutory discovery rule").1 Id.; see also
Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 810; Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. The second setting in which the
"discovery rule" may operate to toll a relevant statute of limitations involves situations

1 "An example of a statutory discovery rule is found in the three-year statute of limitations governing claims based
on fraud or mistake, which provides that a cause of action will not accrue 'until the discovery by the aggrieved party
of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.' Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (2002)." Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at
746.
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where a particular statute of limitations provides only a fixed limitations period with no
"statutory discovery rule" exception.2 Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 746. This second
scenario is commonly referred to as the "equitable discovery rule," and it applies only in
the following two situations: (1) where a plaintiff does not become aware of a cause of
action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (2) where the
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be
irrational or unjust. Id. The first of these two scenarios is commonly known as the
"concealment" or "fraudulent concealment" doctrine. The second of these two scenarios
is commonly known as the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine. However, because the
Town has failed to raise any issue pertaining to the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine
in this appeal, it is only the "fraudulent concealment" version of the discovery rule that is
presently at issue.
A.

Application Of The "Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine".
In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs First and Second Causes of Action are

governed by the four-year statute of limitations period set forth in Utah Code Annotated §
78-12-25 (2006). It is also undisputed that Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action is governed
by the three-year statute of limitations period set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-1226 (2006). Because neither of the foregoing statutes of limitation contain a "statutory
discovery rule," and because Plaintiff has failed to raise any issue involving the

2 An example of a statute of limitations that does not mandate application of the discovery rule is the four-year
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"exceptional circumstances'9 doctrine on appeal, the "fraudulent concealment" version of
the discovery rule is the only applicable doctrine presently at issue. See Russell Packard,
108 P.3d at 746; see also FOOTNOTE 2 above.
Generally speaking, all that is required to trigger the running of a statute of
limitations is sufficient information to apprise the plaintiff of the underlying cause of
action, so as to put the plaintiff on notice to make further inquiry if the plaintiff harbors
doubts or questions about the defendant's conduct. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. However,
under the "fraudulent concealment doctrine," the running of a statute of limitations may
be tolled if (1) a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action; and (2) such lack
of awareness is the result of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct.
Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 816; Russell Packard, 108 P.3d 741; see also Berenda, 914 P.2d at
51. The Utah Supreme Court has held that in order to toll a statute of limitations under
the "fraudulent concealment doctrine," a plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing
that a defendant's actions amounted to fraudulent concealment. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51;
Charlesworth v. Reyns, 113 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2005). Utah case law suggests that a
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment requires proof that a defendant actually
took "affirmative steps" to conceal a plaintiffs cause of action. See Berenda, 914 P.2d at
5\;see Robinson v. Morrow, 99 P.3d 341 (Utah App. 2004); see Rappleye v. Rappleye,
99 P.3d 348 (Utah App. 2004); see Hill v. Alfred, 28 P.3d 1271 (Utah 2001). However, if

statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (2006). See Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 746.
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the facts underlying a plaintiffs allegations of fraudulent concealment are tenuous,
vague, or otherwise insufficient, then the plaintiffs claim fails as a matter of law. Russell
Packard, 108 P.3dat 751.
Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment, he
must next demonstrate either (1) that the plaintiff neither knew, nor reasonably should
have known, of the facts underlying his cause of action before the fixed limitations period
expired; or (2) that notwithstanding the plaintiffs actual or constructive knowledge of the
facts underlying his or her cause of action within the limitations period, a reasonably
diligent plaintiff may have delayed in filing his complaint until after the statute of
limitations expired. Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 816; Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 748;
Charlesworth, 113 P.3dat 1036-1037.
Even though cases of this nature are highly fact-dependent, plaintiffs cannot
"avoid summary judgment simply by asserting that it would have been futile for them to
inquire about potential claims." Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 817. Rather, plaintiffs who have
knowledge of underlying facts must reasonably investigate their claims in order to rely on
the "fraudulent concealment doctrine/5 and a defendant's "mere silence in the face of a
plaintiffs failure to use reasonable diligence in investigating a claim is insufficient
evidence of fraudulent concealment to warrant tolling the statute of limitations." Id. at
817-818. Essentially, before a plaintiff may rely on the "fraudulent concealment
doctrine," he must have actually made an attempt to investigate his claim, and that
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attempt must have been rendered futile as a result of the defendant's fraudulent or
misleading conduct. Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 817. In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to
satisfy the foregoing legal standard.
(i)

The Town Has Failed to Make a Prima Facie Showing of Affirmative Fraudulent
Concealment on the Part of Mr. Veibell.
The Town would have this Court believe that Mr. Veibell has taken affirmative

steps to conceal his alleged fraud, or that Mr. Veibell failed to make a full disclosure of
material information in violation of his fiduciary responsibilities. {See Brief of Appellant
at Pagel 1-13). These assertions are unsubstantiated by verified facts submitted in
consideration of summary judgment. As such, the Town has failed to satisfy the first
prong of the "fraudulent concealment doctrine."
For example, the Town claims in defense of the dismissal that "Mayor Veibell did
not have the vouchers for his $15.00 per hour work approved by the Town Council as
were other Town bills." {See Brief of Appellant at Page 13). This was not the case, and
was not duly presented for summary judgment consideration. Rather, the undisputed fact
is that the Town explicitly agreed during a Town Council meeting that Mr. Veibell was to
submit vouchers directly to the Water Project engineer (Hansen, Allen & Luce), who
would then submit them to Farmers Home Administration and the Drinking Water Board
for approval. (R. at 422-423). The trial record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary,
and no evidence was presented for summary judgment consideration to suggest that the
Town ever requested or required that Mr. Veibell submit each individual voucher directly
-24-

to the Town itself. For all practical purposes, Mr. Veibell's invoices were scrutinized as
directed by the Town at three separate intervals by three separate entities (i.e., the project
engineer, Farmers Home Administration, and the Drinking Water Board) before any
payment was ever issued. What is more, not one entity involved in that multi-level
review process made any allegation of fraud or misconduct against Mr. Veibell, and the
Town knowingly authorized this process to continue without objection. For the Town to
claim on appeal that it had no knowledge of these transactions, or that Mr. Veibell was
violating some valid rule or procedure, without supplying any reliable evidence in support
of such assertions is untenable and improper.
To further cast doubt on the trial court's decision, the Town would have this Court
believe that "Mayor Veibell was careful to have the payments for his [alleged] doubledipping sent to his home rather than to the Town offices." (See Brief of Appellant at Page
13). However, the undisputed facts show that Mr. Veibell's work was not duplicitous or
"double dipping." Moreover, what the Town has conspicuously failed to disclose is the
fact that all records for the Town of Cornish, including records and payment vouchers
pertaining to the Water Project, were by common consent and practice and for the
convenience of the Town kept at the home of the mayor, and possibly other members of
the Town Council. (R. at 179). The Town Council was aware of this customary
arrangement, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest otherwise. Appellant did
not present any fact on summary judgment showing that the Town made a request to
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review the records being maintained at Mr. Veibell's home prior to this lawsuit, or that
Mr. Veibell took action to prevent the Town from doing so. For the Town to now, on
appeal, misconstrue Mr. Veibell's custody of these documents as an attempt to
fraudulently conceal incriminating evidence is also improper. Despite its accusations on
appeal, the Town has had full knowledge of the location of all records pertaining to the
Water Project since the Project's inception, and Mr. Veibell is not to be blamed for the
Town's failure to review or inspect those records in response to its suspicions during
1993, 1995, and 1997.
Similarly, the Town has argued that Mr. Veibell "concealed the whole story from
the County Attorney" and that Mr. Veibell's conduct during the Attorney General's
investigation was "particularly reprehensible" and made "the Town's further delay
unquestionably reasonable." (See Brief of Appellant at Page 14-15). But these arguments
are unsupported by the undisputed facts presented to the trial court for purposes of
summary judgment. More specifically, the Town incorrectly avers that Mr. Veibell
withheld material information from the Cache County Attorney that could have been used
as part of the investigation, including the fact that he was being paid $15.00 per hour for
inspection work in addition to the $10,000 salary increase. (See Brief of Appellant at
Page 6 and 9). However, the portions of the Record to which the Town refers show only
that Mr. Veibell does not specifically recall much of what was discussed or disclosed
during the investigation (which is not implausible given the amount of time that has
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passed since those events transpired). (R. at 316; 340-342; 427-428). The Record also
reflects that Brad Blair (who was investigating the matter on behalf of the Attorney
General and the County Attorney) visited Mr. Veibell at his home, and questioned him
extensively regarding his involvement in the Water Project. (R. at 426-427). During this
meeting, Mr. Veibell answered Mr. Blair's questions, and even provided Mr. Blair with
the identities of other persons who had additional information concerning the subject
matter of the investigation. {Id). These are not the actions of a person who is attempting
to conceal facts, and the Town has supplied no disputation of fact to suggest that the
information provided by Mr. Veibell was anything less than the entire truth. In fact, Mr.
Blair probably even met with other members of the Town Council in connection with his
investigation (R. at 427), which would have only given the Town further opportunity to
assert and investigate its concerns and refute any inaccurate disclosures by Mr. Veibell.
By itself, the Town's vague accusation that Mr. Veibell fraudulently concealed
evidence during the 1997 investigation may be convenient for purposes of the Town's
appeal, but is entirely unsupported by the trial Record. Furthermore, the fact that Mr.
Veibell stood in a fiduciary capacity to the Town does not, by itself, overcome the statute
of limitations. Under law, a fiduciary may have a duty to "speak the truth," but there is no
evidence in the Record to suggest that Mr. Veibell has done anything to the contrary, nor
is there any evidence in the Record to suggest that Mr. Veibell undertook any intentional
actions to conceal the payments which he received or the conduct in which he engaged.
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As a whole, after many opportunities to do so, the Town has failed to evidence any
singularly identifiable act of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Mr. Veibell; thus the
Town failed to make di prima facie showing. That being the case, the various causes of
action asserted by the Town against Mr. Veibell were all properly dismissed by the trial
court.
(ii)

Even if the Town were to have Made a Prima Facie Showing of Affirmative
Fraudulent Concealment, the Town has Failed to Satisfy the Second Prong of the
"Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine".
Despite its failure to do so, but assuming, arguendo, that the Town satisfied the

first prong of the "fraudulent concealment doctrine" by making di prima facie showing of
affirmative fraudulent concealment on the part of Mr. Veibell, there is simply no valid or
plausible reason why the Town of Cornish could not have pursued its claims against Mr.
Veibell within the time fixed by law. During May of 1993, Mr. Veibell was appointed by
the Cornish Town Council as the head of the Water Project. (R. at 5; 122). In
conjunction with those responsibilities, Mr. Veibell's annual salary was increased by
$10,000. (R. at 5; 122; 440). Several months later, on October 14, 1993, the Town
Treasurer reported (during a regular meeting of the Cornish Town Council) that Mr.
Veibell had also been hired as the project inspector on the Water Project, and that he was
going to receive additional compensation from the Town as an independent contractor
with respect to those duties. (R. at 419; 360-361). Thus, as early as October of 1993, the
Town Council was on notice that Mr. Veibell was serving in two capacities with respect
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to the Water Project. Mr. Veibell has also demonstrated that these two positions were
separate and distinct.
On February 9, 1995, the Town Council held another of its regular meetings,
during which the Town Council discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell had been hired by the
Town to inspect the water system for $15.00 per hour in addition to his duties as head of
the Water Project. (R. at 363). At another point during the year 1995, Dyer Pitcher, who
was then serving as a member of the Town Council, called an informal meeting of Town
Council members at his home. (R. at 299-300; 374). The purpose of this unofficial
meeting was to discuss Mr. Veibell's involvement in the Water Project, with particular
emphasis on the fact that Mr. Veibell was being paid $15.00 per hour for his inspection
duties in addition to the compensation he had received as head of the Water Project. (R.
at 300; 374). Mr. Veibell was even invited 1o this informal meeting, and questioned by
the Council members regarding the Council's various concerns. {Id). Thus, the Town
Council was aware that Mr. Veibell was being paid for two separate duties in relation to
the Water Project as far back as February 9, 1995; the Town Council discussed Mr.
Veibell's involvement and compensation on numerous occasions during the year 1995;
and, the Town Council had the opportunity to personally question Mr. Veibell in detail
about his conduct during that same year. Despite the Town's knowledge of Mr. Veibell's
involvement, and its obvious opportunity to take further investigative and remedial action,
the Town Council did nothing.
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Later, during the year 1997, certain Town Council members began to, once again,
question the propriety of the payments that were being made to Mr. Veibell. (R. at 10;
568). In pursuit of these concerns, members of the Town Council contacted the Cache
County Attorney, Scott Wyatt, complained about the payments being made to Mr.
Veibell, and accused Mr. Veibell of criminal conduct. (R. at 426; 568). The Town
Council then requested that Mr. Wyatt conduct an investigation to determine whether Mr.
Veibell had, in fact, committed any criminal wrongdoing. (R. at 10; 569). In response,
Mr. Wyatt ultimately transferred the matter to the Utah Attorney General's Office, who
conducted an investigation of Mr. Veibell. (R. at 393; 569).
On or about May 8, 1997, the Town Council held another of its regular meetings
and, once again, discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell had been hired by the Town to inspect
the water system for $15.00 per hour during the ongoing construction. (R. at 369-372).
During this meeting, the Council also discussed the fact that Mr. Veibell had received a
$10,000 increase in his salary as compensation for his duties as head of the Water Project.
(Id.). Those present at the meeting also discussed the results of the Attorney General's
criminal investigation of Mr. Veibell. (Id.). Despite the various meetings, discussions,
and other events that had previously transpired, the Town took no further action on the
matter until the filing of this lawsuit nearly nine and one-half years later.
Based upon the foregoing, there is no justifiable excuse for the Town's failure to
pursue this case within the applicable periods of limitation. The Town Council was
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aware of Mr. Veibell's salary increase and additional hourly compensation as far back as
October of 1993. The Town Council continued to discuss the issue, and even questioned
Mr. Veibell regarding these payments, throughout the year 1995, and the Town further
discussed the matter and submitted it to the Utah Attorney General's Office for further
investigation during the year 1997. The information known to the Town during 1997
(and prior thereto) was sufficient to timely file suit and bring these claims against Mr.
Veibell. Moreover, it is nonsensical for the Town to have suspected criminal wrongdoing
on the part of Mr. Veibell from 1993 through 1997, and to have instigated a criminal
investigation of Mr. Veibell during 1997, only to have simultaneously taken no civil
action to remedy the situation and recover the amounts, if any, that Mr. Veibell had,
allegedly, wrongfully misappropriated. If the Town had enough information to pursue
criminal charges during 1997, then it certainly had enough information to pursue civil
charges at that same point in time, especially given the fact that the Town's criminal
accusations would have required a far more stringent burden of proof than its civil
concerns.
Mr. Veibell has denied any wrongdoing whatsoever. However, under the plain and
undisputed facts of this case, the Town of Cornish undoubtedly had enough information
to at least file suit and pursue each of its Causes of Action against Mr. Veibell as far back
as 1993, but certainly no later than May of 1997. Under the circumstances, the Town
should have filed its Complaint against Mr. Veibell by no later than May 8, 2001 (i.e.,
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four years after the May 8, 1997 Town Council Meeting). Accordingly, the Town should
be held accountable for its own negligence, and Mr. Veibell should not have been forced
to bear the burden of this defense nearly fifteen years after the commencement of his
duties with regard to the Water Project.

II.

THE TOWN'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST MR. VEIBELL
FOR "FRAUD" HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY APPEALED, AND THE
TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF SAID CLAIM CANNOT BE
ADDRESSED OR OVERTURNED.
It appears from the language of Appellant's Brief that the Town is appealing the

trial court's decision with regard to each of its respective Causes of Action, including its
Fourth Cause of Action alleging "fraud." The Town's appeal is based, entirely, on the
premise that the Town has satisfied the requirements of the "fraudulent concealment
doctrine." In making this argument, the Town impliedly and expressly asserts that the
"fraudulent concealment doctrine" applies to each of its respective Causes of Action,
including its Fourth Cause of Action for "fraud." More specifically, the Town claims that
the "Trial Court erroneously concluded that the fraudulent concealment branch of the
discovery rule did not apply to Cornish Town's fraud claim because of the statutory
discovery provision with regard to fraud." {See Brief of Appellant at Page 15). Despite
these assertions, and the Town's misguided reliance on the case of Berenda v. Langford,
the "fraudulent concealment" branch of the "equitable discovery rule" does not apply to
the Town's Fourth Cause of Action for "fraud."
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In the more recent Russell Packard case, the Utah Supreme Court clarified prior
case law and emphasized that the "equitable discovery rule," including the "fraudulent
concealment doctrine," apply only where a statute of limitations does not, by its own
terms, already account for such circumstances (i.e., where a statute of limitations lacks a
"statutory discovery rule"). Russell Packard, 108 P.3d at 747. The Court specifically
held that "it would be inappropriate to apply the concealment version of the discovery
rule in the context of the three-year statute of limitations for fraud" contained in Utah
Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3). Id. As pari of this clarification, the Supreme Court
specifically modified its prior holding in Berenda (the case on which the Town relies),
which had suggested that the "concealment" and "exceptional circumstances" versions of
the "equitable discovery rule" may apply even where a statute of limitations contains a
statutory discovery rule. Id.
The Town's Fourth Cause of Action against Mr. Veibell was dismissed based on
the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-1226(3)(2006), which contains an internal "statutory discovery rule." (R. at 637-639). As
such, the Town's generalized appeal based on the "fraudulent concealment doctrine"
cannot be applied to Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action for "fraud." Because the Town
has failed to assert an alternative ground for appeal with regard to its Fourth Cause of
Action, said Cause of Action is not at issue, and this Court cannot address or overturn the
trial court's dismissal of the same.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Veibell respectfully requests that the May 9, 2008
Order entered by the trial court in this case be upheld and affirmed, and that the relief
requested in Appellant's appeal be denied. Mr. Veibell also respectfully requests an
award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

2f>

DATED this 2l_ day of November, 2008.
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

J.Fife
Jonathan R. Palmer
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE

TOWN OF CORNISH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 060102639

vs.
FLOYD VEIBELL,
Defendant.

On or about December 12,2006, Defendant filed aMotion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint
based upon Defendant's position that the statutes of limitations had run on all of Plaintiff s claims.
Defendant Motion to Dismiss was subsequently converted by the Court into a motion for summary
judgment. Thereafter the parties engaged in discovery and submitted supplemental memoranda to
the Court. A hearing was also held on Defendant's converted Motion for Summary Judgment on
February 19, 2008. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement
and issued its Decision granting Defendant's converted Motion for Summary Judgment on April 16,
O N & HOGG AN, P C
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW
30 S O U T H MAIN, SUITE

200

P O BOX 525
LOGAN, UTAH 84323-0525
(435)752-1551

2008.
For the reason's set forth in the Court's April 16, 2008 Decision, Defendant's converted
Motion for Summary Judgment is herby granted and Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant is
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.

TREMONTON OFFICE
1 2 3 EAST MAIN
P O BOX 115
TREMONTON, UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
(435) 257-3885
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DATED this

*T

day ofAprrg2008.

fuage Thomas L. Willmore

AND RULE 7(f) CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 2(*~ day of April, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, to the following:
Blake S. Atkin
William O. Kimball
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
136 South Main, Suite A401
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if no objection to
this ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT is submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days after
service, the original will be filed with the Court for signature.

Kevin J. Fife
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

TOWN OF CORNISH,
DECISION
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 060102639

vs.
FLOYD VEIBELL,

Judge: Thomas L. Willmore
Defendant.

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Floyd Veibell's
(hereinafter "Defendant" or "Veibell") Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs
Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Court's Questions at the Hearing Dated February
19, 2008. In preparation of its decision, the Court has reviewed the Defendant's Motions and
Memoranda in Support, Plaintiffs Memoranda in Opposition, Defendant's Replies in Support,
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in
Support, Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Statute of
Limitations, the Court's Memorandum Decisions dated February 21, 2007 and November 29,
2007, respectively, each document and affidavit submitted before the Court, and the applicable
case law and statutory provisions. A hearing was also held on Defendant's Mtf/cw to Dismiss on
February 19, 2008. Following the hearing, Plaintiff submitted an unsolicited Supplemental
Memorandum in Response to Court's Questions at the Hearing Dated February 19, 2008 with
supporting affidavits. As noted above, Defendant responded with & Motion to Strike the
unsolicited Memorandum which is also now before the Court. Having considered the foregoing,
the Court issues this Decision.
I.

Defendant Floyd Veibell's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in
Response to Court's Questions at the Hearing Dated February 19\ 2008.
Following the February 19, 2008 hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff

Town of Cornish (hereinafter "Cornish" or "Plaintiff') filed an unsolicited Memorandum in
1

Response to questions the Court propounded to Plaintiff during the hearing and to which Plaintiff
felt it was "not able to give ... complete answers on the spur of the moment." As noted above, the
Court did not request additional briefing on the questions asked at the hearing and the Rules of
Civil Procedure do not allow an unsolicited Memorandum to be filed. Plaintiff cites two cases
where post-hearing supplemental briefings were considered by the trial court; however, in both
cases, the trial courts had requested such briefing from the parties. Here, Plaintiff had more than
one year to conduct discovery and submit any evidence it felt was sufficient to support its case,
either in its several supplemental memoranda filed prior to the hearing or at the hearing.
Furthermore, the Court extended the original discovery period at Plaintiffs request, see
Memorandum Decision, dated February 21, 2007, and allowed Plaintiff an additional two weeks
to provide the Court with very specific evidence relating to Defendant'sMtf/arc to Dismiss prior
to the hearing. {See Memorandum Decision, dated November 29, 2007.)
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff was provided with sufficient time to prepare for
the hearing on Defendant' § Motion to Dismiss and to provide the Court with any evidence it felt
was relevant. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has failed to set forth good cause sufficient to justify
review of the unsolicited Memorandum. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's Morion to
Strike and will not consider Plaintiffs unsolicited Supplemental Memorandum in Response to
Court's Questions at the Hearing Dated February 19, 2008.
II.

Defendant Floyd Veibell'SM^ZOA? to Dismiss.
On or about December 12, 2006, Defendant Floyd Veibell filed & Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs Complaint. However, as has noted by the Court in its prior Decisions, since both
parties have submitted evidence outside of the pleadings, the Court will treat the Motion to
Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In the instant matter, Floyd Veibell served as the Mayor of the Town of Cornish during
the years 1990 through 1998. In 1993, the Cornish Town Council approved Resolution 93-2, the
purpose of which was to "(1) provide constant supervision and administration of the Cornish
culinary water system project through completion, (2) provide the necessary manpower to set up
monitoring and recording procedures for new water quality requirements mandated by Congress
and administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, and (3) develop a Drinking Water

2

^

*> ^ s

Source Protection Plan as required by new State of Utah regulations [hereinafter known as the
"Water Project"]." (Compl. atffif6-7.) In 1993, Defendant Veibell was appointed by the Town
Council to manage the Water Project and his annual salary was increased by $10,000.00 as
compensation for the added responsibility. In addition to the increase in salary however, Plaintiff
alleges that Veibell was also being paid $15.00 per hour by the Town of Cornish for other work
he was performing for Cornish as an independent sub-contractor on the same Water Project.
Cornish alleges that Veibell never disclosed to the Town Council that he was being paid twice for
the same work.
Plaintiff alleges that during the years 1993 through 1997, Veibell submitted expense
vouchers in various amounts for services he claimed to have performed relating to the Water
Project. However, none of the vouchers or payments were presented to the Town Council for
approval and after the Water Project was completed in 1994, Defendant Veibell allegedly
continued to submit expense vouchers for the next three years relating to work on the completed
Water Project. The Town of Cornish claims that not only was Veibell paid twice by Cornish to
complete the Water Project, but he never completed the Water Project himself, paying a third
party approximately $9,000.00 out of city funds to complete it. Finally, between 1993 and 1997,
the record shows that there were discussions involving the Town Council or members therefrom
regarding concerns about Veibell and his involvement in the Water Project; furthermore, in 1997,
the Attorney General's Office conducted a criminal investigation of Veibell's conduct and found
no evidence of wrongdoing. See Letter from Scott L. Wyatt, County Attorney, Cache County,
Utah, to C. Floyd Veibell, Mayor, Town of Cornish (May 5, 1997).
The Town of Cornish took no further action until itfiledits Complaint on November 17,
2006. Veibell, shortly thereafter, moved to dismiss the Complaint arguing that Cornish's four
alleged causes of action—(1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) money by false pretenses; (3)
conversion; and (4)fraud—areall barred by their applicable statutes of limitations. Veibell argues
that the four year statute of limitations set forth in UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-12-25(3)
governs and bars Cornish's first and second causes of action for "breach offiduciaryduty" and
"money by false pretenses," respectively. Cornish claims in response that the applicable statute of
limitations for its first and second causes of action has been tolled by the "(equitable) discovery
rule," aflfirmative misrepresentations made by Veibell, and exceptional circumstances. Veibell next
argues that Cornish's third cause of action for "conversion" is governed and barred by the three
3

year statute of limitations set forth in UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-12-26. Cornish again argues
that the statute of limitations is tolled by the "(equitable) discovery rule" as well as concealment
and affirmative misrepresentations made by Veibell. Finally, Veibell argues that Cornish's fourth
cause of action for "fraud" is barred by the three year statute of limitation set forth in UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED § 78-12-26(3). In response, Cornish claims that the fraud statute's internal
"discovery rule" operates to toll the statute of limitations. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3).
Mr. Veibell claims that all of the above-noted statute of limitations began to run, at the
latest, in either 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000 or 2001; thereby, barring Cornish's four causes of action
which were allfiledin 2006. Cornish however argues that the applicable statutes of limitations
have been tolled as the facts forming the basis for the cause of action were not and could not have
been discoverable until the preparation of the Complaint in this case, even after reasonable
diligence and inquiry. Furthermore, Cornish alleges that Veibell intentionally withheld information
(i.e., during the 1997 criminal investigation finding no evidence of wrongdoing) that would have
otherwise enabled Cornish to have discovered the alleged fraud and other causes of action in this
case, thus invoking the "discovery rule" so as to toll the applicable statute of limitations.
In accordance with Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "summary judgment
is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When a motion for
summary judgment is made, the affidavit of the nonmoving party must contain "specific
evidentiary facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699
P.2d 747 (Utah 1985); see also Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) (holding that
the affiant's "mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to
support that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion").
Furthermore, "[t]o successfully defend against a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving
party must set forth facts sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case. Failure to do so with regard to any of the essential elements of that party's claim will result
in a conclusion that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Anderson Dev.
Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 332 (Utah 2005). However, "doubts or uncertainties concerning
issues of fact properly presented, or the nature of inferences to be drawn from the facts, are to be
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment." Webster, 675
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P.2d at 1172; see also Bowen v. Riverton City, Utah, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982).
Furthermore, as to application of the discovery rule in Utah, the Courts have indicated that
the discovery rule operates to toll the statute of limitations "until the discovery of facts forming
the basis for the cause of action." Id. Moreover, the discovery rule "operates either when
provided for by statute (the 'statutory discovery rule') or when required by equity (the 'equitable
discovery rule'). The statute may be tolled under the equitable discovery rule when either
exceptional circumstances or the defendant's [affirmative] fraudulent concealment prevents the
plaintiff from timely filing suit." Id. (citation omitted). The courts have also indicated that the
application of the discovery rule "involves a subsidiary factual determination—the point at which
a person reasonably should know that he has suffered a legal injury." Colosimo v. Roman
Catholic Bishop, 156 P.3d 806, 810 (Utah 2007). Nonetheless, when the plaintiff fails to make a
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment (i.e., affirmative steps), the equitable discovery
rule cannot be invoked to toll the applicable statutes of limitations, as a matter of law, since the
plaintiff would have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to affirmative concealment
See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996).
Here, Cornish first seeks to toll the statutes of limitations through application of the
"equitable discovery rule" to its first three causes of action for "breach of fiduciary duty;" "money
under false pretenses;" and "conversion." Under the exceptional circumstances doctrine of the
"equitable discovery rule," the statute of limitations period is tolled "where the case presents
exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust,
regardless of any showing that the defendant... prevented the discovery of the cause of action."
Colosimo, 156P.3dat812. The Courts have held that for this exception to apply, "an initial
showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have discovered
the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within [the applicable
limitations period]." Id (citation omitted). Next, the Courts have indicated that the fraudulent
concealment version of the "equitable discovery rule" applies so as to toll the running of the
limitations period when "a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct." Id (citation omitted). More specifically, in order
for the fraudulent concealment doctrine to apply,
fP]laintiff must demonstrate either (1) that the plaintiff neither knew nor
reasonably should have known of the facts underlying his or her cause of action
before the fixed limitations period expired; or (2) that notwithstanding the
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plaintiffs actual or constructive knowledge of the facts underlying his or her cause
of action within the limitations period, a reasonably diligent plaintiff may have
delayed in filing his or her complaint until after the statute of limitations expired.
[Emphasis added.]
Colosimo, 156P.3dat816 (citationomitted).
Also, in Berenda v. Langford, supra, the court indicated that "when a plaintiff alleges that
a defendant took affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiffs cause of action ... [as is the case here,]
the plaintiff can avoid full operation of the discovery rule by making & prima facie showing of
fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that given the defendant's actions, a reasonable
plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier." Berenda, 914 P. 2d at 54 (emphasis added).
After reviewing the parties' arguments, both in their pleadings as well as at the hearing
held on February 19, 2008, the Court finds that the Town of Cornish has failed to make a prima
facie showing of affirmative fraudulent concealment by Defendant Veibell. While the Town of
Cornish alleges that Veibell's mere nondisclosure to the Attorney General's Office and members
of the Town Council constitutes affirmative fraudulent concealment under the "equitable
discovery rule," the courts have indicated that a plaintiff must show that affirmative steps have
been taken to conceal, which the Court finds to be beyond the mere nondisclosure alleged in the
present matter. See generally Berenda v. Longford, supra. Accordingly, while a determination of
whether the Plaintiff was reasonably diligent in investigating the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs
Complaint sufficient to toll the statute of limitations requires a subsidiary factual determination,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to affirmative
concealment by Veibell and as a result, Plaintiffs first three causes of action fail as a matter of
law. Id. at 54. Therefore, as a matter of law, since Plaintiff has failed to make aprima facie
showing of fraudulent concealment, the equitable discovery rule cannot be invoked to toll the
applicable statutes of limitations, respectively, and as such, Plaintiffs first three causes of action
are hereby barred.
With respect to Cornish's fourth cause of action alleging fraud, the statutory provision of
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-12-26(3) operates to toll the running of the statutory limitations
period of three years until a plaintiff "either discovers] or should have discovered his or her cause
of action." Colosimo, 156P.3dat811. Furthermore, concerning an action for fraud, the "plaintiff
is deemed to have discovered his action when he has actual knowledge of the fraud cor by
reasonable diligence and inquiry should know, the relevant facts of the fraud perpetrated against
6

him [emphasis added]." Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Courts have held that in such
circumstance, "if a party has knowledge of some underlying facts, then that party must reasonably
investigate potential causes of action because the limitations period will run." Id. (citations
omitted).
Here, the Cornish Town Council convened on October 14, 1993 and discussed the fact
that Veibell was being "paid as a contractor for his work on the new system." See Minutes from
the Cornish Town Council Meeting, Cornish, Utah (October 14, 1993). On February 9, 1995, the
Cornish Town Council again met and discussed the fact that Veibell had been "hired by the town
to inspect the water system for $15.00 per hour from project beginning to end." See Minutes from
the Cornish Town Council Meeting, Cornish, Utah (February 9, 1995); see also Memorandum re:
Cornish Town Water System Improvements Project from William S. Bigelow, P.E. (February 9,
1995). It also appears that during the year 1995, an informal meeting was held with Town Council
members where Veibell's involvement in the Water Project was discussed. See Affidavit of Kelly
Naegle,ffif3-5; Affidavit of Dale Buxtonfflf3-6. In 1997, as noted above, the Town initiated a
criminal investigation of Veibell regarding his involvement with the Water Project and his
handling of public funds. See Letter from Scott L. Wyatt to Mayor Veibell, supra. Finally, on May
8, 1997, the Town Council met and discussed the issue of Veibell receiving an extra $15.00 per
hour for his work on the Water Project. See Minutes from the Cornish Town Council Meeting,
Cornish, Utah (May 8, 1997).
Based on the evidence in the record and as partially noted above, it is clear to the Court
that the Town knew enough during the years 1993 through 1997 to investigate a potential
lawsuit. Particularly, the Court finds it quite telling that the Town had sufficient facts in 1997 to
suspect wrongdoing and request that the Attorney General's Office conduct a criminal
investigation. It is therefore apparent to the Court that the Town knew enough or through
reasonable diligence should have known enough relevant facts concerning Veibell's alleged
fraudulent conduct during the years 1993 through 1997 to have pursued a cause of action of fraud
prior to 2000 (three years later). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3). Based on the undisputed
facts of this matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff had ample opportunity to investigate and assert
its cause of action for fraud prior to the year 2000. The Town Council could easily have requested
and reviewed any and all pertinent financial documents and/or other relevant documents they now
rely on in support of their claims. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff discovered and/or had at
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its disposal sufficient information in 1997 to bring the present action for fraud by the year 2000 as
it had "actual knowledge of the fraud cor by reasonable diligence and inquiry should have know,
the relevant facts of the fraud perpetrated against him..'" Colosimo, 156 P.3d at 811 (citation
omitted); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3).
While Plaintiff argues that "weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct in light
of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause[s] of action necessitates the type of factual findings
which preclude summary judgment in all but the clearest of cases," Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54, the
Court finds that here, Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of "affirmative"
fraudulent concealment and as a matter of law the equitable discovery rule cannot be invoked to
toll the applicable statutes of limitations. Furthermore, it is clear to the Court that the Town of
Cornish should have reasonably known or discovered at least some evidence sufficient to bring its
cause of action for fraud prior to the year 2000 since, based on the record and the evidence set
forth by the parties and as referenced herein, the Town should have known or at least made
further diligent inquiry no later than 1997.
Therefore, even in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (the Town), the Court
finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that Defendant Veibell is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant Veibell' $ Motion to
Dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment, and counsel for Defendant Veibell is directed
to prepare an order in conformance herewith.
Dated this f (p

day of April, 2008.
BY THE COURT:
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